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SE Bypass
- A Chronology

EIS Analysis
- Adequacy Review

Iss. Environ. Council
Biological Assessment Peer Review

Issaquah Voices

Hank Thomas
Concerned Citizen of Issaquah
Past City Councilor

The intent of this research is to discover and summarize the evolutionary steps leading to the current S.E. Bypass controversy. I fundamentally believe that these steps were taken for what seemed like good reasons at the time, and that the cumulative result has unintentionally evolved into the current controversy. Understanding what went wrong might yield some possible actions to bridge the deep chasm now dividing the Issaquah community.

I have tried to conduct a thorough research leading up to this summarization. Many of the documents used in this effort have been obtained through the Freedom of Information process. It would be fair to say that other City Councilors have not had the opportunity to review many – perhaps most - of the documents included in this research.

The following paragraphs will not be easy reading and I apologize for that. My goal is to condense and present the history of the project as completely as possible, while maintaining chronological integrity and context of the source documents.

An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is, in its most basic form, a decision-making tool. Used properly, the EIS will cause to be analyzed all of the elements of the "affected environment" in and around the project area. It also addresses the cumulative impact of multiple projects where such relationships potentially exist.

Once the "affected environment" has been established, each of the environmental elements are thoroughly analyzed for impacts from the project or projects under consideration. There are two reasons for this analysis. First, a thorough analysis will expose potential cost drivers in the design and construction phase so that the cost estimates for the project can best represent the final actual cost of the project. The second reason involves the development of necessary and appropriate mitigation measures for the environmental impacts so that the remaining environmental damage will be held to a minimum – and hopefully acceptable – level. In the end, it will be the legislative body – in this case City Council – of the governing jurisdiction – in this case Issaquah – where the decision on acceptability will be formalized.

Bearing in mind that we can’t mitigate unknown impacts, a poorly prepared EIS will inevitably lead to unanticipated environmental impacts and design challenges requiring mitigation at substantially higher project cost. Cost overruns for design and mitigation will be balanced against environmental damage and financial resources will drive subsequent mitigation efforts. The community will lose in either case because they will either pay for the mitigation or live with the unmitigated environmental damage. Quality of life and natural resources will become the inevitable victims of a poorly done EIS.

A commitment to engage in a process, the outcome of which is expected to be construction of the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road, is not the same as a commitment to build the project. Indeed, the reason the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) came into being as protections for our environment was specifically to prevent such obligations from being incurred. Remember that the EIS process is a decision-making process. It starts by defining the "affected environment." Then the project impact to that "affected environment" is determined and possible mitigation measures are proposed. Only then can the residual "environmental damage" be ascertained and evaluated for acceptability in the affected community. Some will say I am splitting hairs when I argue that the City of Issaquah committed to a process with the ultimate intent of building the project and not to the construction of the project without regard to the consequences. If this is hair-splitting then it’s a hair in need of splitting because it is the fundamental purpose of both the NEPA and SEPA Protections. Unless this hair is split, our environment is without protection and our quality of life is meaningless.

When the Southeast Issaquah Bypass project EIS process began in early 1996, it was anticipated that it would become a NEPA as well as a SEPA controlled effort. At the time there was no specific linkage to the NEPA process. So the consultant’s original Statement-of-Work (SOW) provided funding for SEPA and placeholder language for NEPA. Even less clear was the potential for meeting the requirements of the Interagency 404 Merger process, which would be invoked by the infringement on wetlands and streams at the south end of the project.

At the beginning of either a NEPA or a SEPA EIS process, it is necessary to define the "affected environment" in terms that meet the requirements of all the project stakeholders. SEPA provides for use of a "checklist" as a means of determining whether the project has "significance" or is of "non-significance" in terms of its anticipated impacts. The checklist was never actually completed. However, it was decided that a "Full EIS" would be completed.

With this foundation, here are the documentation steps in chronological sequence.

Prior to 1981, the City of Issaquah had apparently not completed a comprehensive analysis of its traffic situation. We can imagine that there were problems and/or concerns just by the fact of the study itself. It was obvious growth was coming, and no real plan for dealing with it was in place.

In 1982, a study of Issaquah traffic circulation patterns was completed. Actual traffic counts were taken at a number of locations and the data extrapolated to produce an estimate of average traffic on a monthly, daily, and even hourly basis. Conversion factors were developed to allow calculation of desired results given some updated starting point data from new traffic counts. Similarly, calculations of vehicle classification, turning movements and even pedestrian utilization were possible to estimate. One might argue that by today’s standards this technique was imprecise. But it was a low-cost estimating tool adequate for the City’s needs at the time.

Known as "The Chris Brown Study," the product was a proposed "small block" street system specifically avoiding the geometric problems of "super blocks" and arterials in conflict with Issaquah’s topographical constraints. Several projects were proposed to transform the existing transportation infrastructure into the future system envisioned by the Study.

In the Study there is reference to congestion on Front Street in the Commercial Business District (CBD) north of Sunset Way. The cause of the congestion was twofold: First, the regional pass-through traffic primarily during the evening commute; and second, the confined functionality of the Front Street/Sunset Way intersection.

Four projects were offered to aid in relieving the congestion. The extension of Gilman Blvd, on the east end to connect with 3^rd Avenue across the east fork of the Issaquah Creek, would have provided an alternative route for local residential trips to/from I-90 and/or the shopping areas along Gilman Blvd. An undercrossing of I-90 at the railroad right-of-way also would have removed some local circulation from Front Street north in the vicinity of the Front Street interchange. While neither of these projects were thought to be major improvements and both came with significant penalties to the community, there was thought to be a net overall benefit to the residents of Issaquah. The third project involved construction of additional off-street parking capability in the Commercial Business District so that curbside parking on Front Street could be curtailed during the evening commute hours. The lynchpin project was a reconfiguration of the Front Street/Sunset Way intersection without which the benefits of the other three projects could not be realized.

As of this writing, the earliest reference found to a "bypass" is found in a 1986 study done for the City of Issaquah by INCA Engineers, Inc. of Bellevue. Titled "I-90 Subarea Traffic & Circulation Analysis," the effort attempted to offer an understanding of the Issaquah transportation infrastructure in the near proximity of I-90. The main focus was on arterials, but local streets were also given some attention. Three developments were specifically studied for their impact: Pickering Place, Cabot, Cabot & Forbes (south side of Gilman and east of Safeway), and Vyzis (north of SE 56 St. roughly where Microsoft is now located) projects were of sufficient scale and maturity to warrant inclusion.

Within the report there is reference to need for a "bypass" of the Front Street corridor. The concern was for overloading the Front Street interchange and the infrastructure between Gilman Blvd. and the Issaquah-Fall City Rd. intersections. The "Bypass," within the context of this early document involved adding a new westbound on-ramp and eastbound off-ramp capability to the already existing Sunset Way interchange. There is reference in this early study to "the villages" which we would reasonably expect to be Grand Ridge (later Issaquah Highlands), Cougar East Village (later Talus), and Park Pointe. There is an absence of discussion regarding growth south of Issaquah, although the entire effort is undertaken to analyze the effect of growth on the existing transportation infrastructure.

In 1989 a collaborative effort of City of Issaquah, King County, and Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) concluded the I-90 Issaquah Area Access Study. The consulting firm of Parsons Brinckerhoff organized the study around the efforts of the Eastside Transportation Program (ETP) Technical Advisory Committee and Steering Committee activities. The composition of these committees was City of Issaquah, King County, WSDOT, City of Bellevue and representatives of various private sector development firms. Simultaneously, the Puget Sound Council of Governments (PSCOG) and Eastside Transportation Program were also conducting studies relating to I-90 accesses in and around the City of Issaquah.

The I-90 Issaquah Area Access Study focused on five interchanges from Lakemont to High Point with particular attention on the two most-used interchanges at SR 900 and Front Street.

Growth pressures on the Sammamish Plateau, in Newcastle, Tibbetts-East Cougar Mountain and along Gilman Boulevard was (and would continue) causing increased traffic congestion in the vicinity of (and on) I-90 in the area of Issaquah. The membership of this study activity used a brainstorming activity to develop alternative solutions to the growing congestion problem. Each of the alternatives was evaluated using a weighted scoring system. In the end the weighting criteria were prioritized as follows:

The alternatives were then analyzed using traffic modeling to select near-term and longer-range projects for accomplishment.

The major product of the study was the realization that growth on the Sammamish Plateau could be accommodated by construction of new ramps serving the westerly direction from the existing Sunset Way Interchange. The addition of those ramps also would relieve congestion pressures on the SR 900 and Front Street Interchanges. The growth on the Sammamish Plateau was served by the "Bear Creek/Sammamish Arterial" which seems to connect northward from the Sunset Way Interchange to SR 202. To the south of the Sunset Way Interchange, the Southeast Issaquah Bypass was to accommodate regional traffic resulting from growth along the Issaquah-Hobart Road. The document did not define that growth.

It was June 11, 1992 when the first I-90/Sunset Interchange S.E. Bypass Public Open House was held to discuss the project and obtain feedback from the community regarding the feasibility of the project. According to a summarization of the meeting by Bell-Walker Engineers – the consultants hired to conduct the briefing:

A second Public Open House was held in October. According to the notes from that meeting:

In order to complete the desired ramp upgrades at the Sunset Way interchange, it was necessary to gain the approval of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The criteria for that approval was addressed by six policy points as follows:

Completed in June of 1995, a document prepared by Bell-Walker Engineers, Inc. and titled "I-90/Sunset Way Interchange, Additional Access to Interstate 90, Fulfillment of Requirements of the Federal Highway Administration Policy for Additional Access to the Interstate System" responded to each of the six policy points for the existing condition (1994), the opening day (2000) and the design year (2015).

As one might expect from the title, the report concentrates on analysis of traffic volumes over the lifetime of the study from 1994 through 2015. The volumes were studied between the E. Mercer Way (on Mercer Island) and High Point interchanges by establishing the base flow at each end and then adding each successive on-ramp and subtracting each successive off-ramp volume to calculate the mainline volume at each intermediate mainline segment of the roadway. The imprecise nature of actual traffic counts made some small adjustments necessary in order to achieve a mathematical balance in the volume tabulations. To estimate the build year (2000) and the design year (2015) volumes, an annual growth factor of 1.6% was applied to the existing condition year (1994) volume figures for volumes west of the Lakemont Interchange. Remember that these escalations flow through the analyzed system owing to the mathematical balance designed into the analysis. An effort to verify the tabulations in the document using the escalation factor was unsuccessful.

Three computer models were involved in the process. A Freeway Operations analysis model (FREQ10PL) provided HOV utilization volumes and mainline lane utilization volumes for the I-90 facility. TMODEL was used to convert land use and local transportation infrastructure volumes into resulting ramp demand volumes at each of the intermediate interchanges. Particular focus was placed on the interchanges between Lakemont and High Point since these ramps would receive the greatest relief resulting from upgrades at the Sunset Way Interchange. The third software – TRANSYT-7F – was used to evaluate surface-street infrastructure performance in terms of queue length and intersection delay in order to assign a Level of Service (LOS) to each of the infrastructure elements of interest. The models were run for each of three alternatives at the Sunset Way interchange:

Both AM and PM peak hour volumes were analyzed for comparison. The results were reported as a justification argument for upgrading the westbound on-ramp and eastbound off-ramp capabilities at the Sunset Way Interchange.

It is interesting to note that as far as this document is concerned, the need for the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road (Alternative 3) has less to do with the upgrades at the Sunset Way Interchange and more to do with City of Issaquah’s acceptance of additional traffic volumes being shifted onto local streets. According to the Surface Street System analysis on page 39, "80 percent of projected traffic anticipated to use the Southeast Bypass Road were routed onto collector routes to the east of Front Street and south of Sunset Way to gain access to the new ramps." It was the pressure of this anticipated volume that caused the Southeast Issaquah Bypass to be considered. In other words, the Southeast Issaquah Bypass is a local project as far as this document is concerned.

If the Bypass is a local project, why are the FHWA and WSDOT agencies involved? Since the Bypass would connect to the limited access I-90, which is under the jurisdiction of these two agencies, their involvement is necessary whether or not their agencies are "proponents" of the project.

Policy Point 6 provides some discussion that is most relevant to any understanding of how the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road fit into the overall plan at that time. "Policy Point 6 – Request Coordination," provides a compilation of agency commitments as they existed when the document was written. Port Blakley committed: To allow Grand Ridge to be annexed into Issaquah; to enter into the Urban Village Development Agreement provisions; to be bound by the Master Transportation Financing Agreement (MTFA); and to provide mitigation for Grand Ridge impacts. King County committed: To improvements along E Lake Sammamish Parkway; to coordinated METRO involvement in expansion of Issaquah park-and-ride facilities; and to involvement in the Sammamish Plateau Access Road (SPAR) construction process. Finally, the City of Issaquah committed: To implement a local shuttle service (route 200); to allow queuing of HOV traffic on arterial streets to aid in the effectiveness of I-90 ramp metering; to widening (phase 1) of S.E. 56^th Street; to the Maple St. extension; and to be bound by the Master Transportation Financing Agreement (MTFA) as it relates to the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road.

These commitments by each of the agencies were used to guarantee – to FHWA and WSDOT – that the feeder infrastructure would be provided to fulfill the anticipated utilization of the new ramps at the Sunset Way interchange.

For some reason the document was revised and republished in 1996 without explanation of the revised text or data. The resulting argument became more compelling in support of the new ramps. That said, the 1995 version of this document was used as justification for the first City funding of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road.

The City Council Meeting of December18, 1995 was notable for two Agenda Bills passing that evening. Agenda Bill 3877, "Grand Ridge Three Party Agreement" and Agenda Bill 3911, "Environmental Impact Statement for S.E. Bypass."

The Council Committee "update" language from Agenda Bill 3911 offers some insight as to what the Council understood about the S.E. Bypass at the time.

Identified as Change Order #1, The first Statement of Work (SOW) for the Consultant (Parsons Brinckerhoff) contained only tasking under the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).

The Grand Ridge Joint Agreement, with the Master Transportation Financing Agreement (MTFA) contained as Appendix F, was signed in June of 1996. This contractual document was signed by County Executive Gary Locke for King County, City Councilor and Mayor Pro Tem Jim Connor for the City of Issaquah, and James E. Warjone, President of both the Grand Ridge Partnership (Limited Partnership) and the Glacier Ridge Partnership (Limited Partnership).

Within the terms of the MTFA the City of Issaquah agreed to be responsible for the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road project with some limited support from the other parties.

According to the language contained therein, "The parties recognize that the construction of the Bypass is integral to resolution of an existing transportation problem within the City created by regional traffic. Such problem would be further exacerbated by any additional development on the Sammamish Plateau or south of the City limits. It is the parties' intention that construction of the Bypass proceed concurrently with the construction of the Sunset Interchange in order to minimize further impacts to the City." Were it not for the Force Majure provisions of the contract, the City of Issaquah would already be in default of its responsibility under the MTFA and subject to legal action by the other parties.

A little later in the MTFA there is language bearing on the question of financial responsibility. It says, "Nothing in this agreement shall require the City or the County to issue bonds or to pledge its full faith and credit to perform the obligations under this agreement, but failure to issue such bond or pledge shall not affect the obligation of the City or County to pay or contribute funds as provided herein." The MTFA contains language requiring a $1.4M contribution from the Partnership if the overall project cost exceeded $15.3M. The parties agreed to assist in the application for grant funding; but failing that, it remains the City of Issaquah’s financial obligation to build the Southeast Issaquah Bypass. Most recent cost estimates place the price of the project at about $44M.

Continued reading brings clarification of EIS responsibility when the MTFA says, "The City, County and State should be co-lead agencies, and the City shall be the administrative lead agency for purposes of SEPA. As administrative lead agency, the City shall make and implement decisions to complete EIS preparation, but shall refer any major decisions to the co-lead agencies for mutual approval. The Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") shall be the federal lead agency for purposes of NEPA. Each co-lead agency shall review, recommend modifications and approve the EIS once it determines it is adequate."

In a June 3, 1996 Journal American article by Linda Thielke entitled – "Front Street bypass fragmenting Issaquah" there was some prophetic discussion:

By October of 1996 with Rowan Hinds still the Mayor of Issaquah, the composition of the Council had changed and there was apparently a growing awareness of the controversy. In an effort to keep the projects more open to the public, the City Council voted unanimously to maintain oversight through the Committee of the Whole (COW) by requiring monthly briefings for the project. As a result of this vote the Public Works Staff began producing monthly status reports for the Council. There were also newsletters for the citizens regarding progress.

In a Public Notice issued in November of 1996, the City of Issaquah announced the meeting where the scope of the impending Environmental Studies ("affected environment") would be finalized. The notice read as follows: "The City of Issaquah, in cooperation with the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) and the Federal highway Administration (FHWA), will hold an agency scoping meeting to solicit comments prior to preparing a NEPA/SEPA Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on a proposal to construct a new bypass arterial expected to connect I-90, in the vicinity of the Sunset Interchange, with Issaquah-Hobart Road. The EIS will also address other cumulative impacts, taking into consideration two separate but related projects which are in the preliminary design phase and are undergoing separate environmental review: (1) the proposed South Sammamish Plateau Access Road (South SPAR) and Sunset Interchange modification project, and (2) the proposed North Sammamish Plateau Access Road (North SPAR)."

In December of 1996 a "Determination of Significance" was completed and the "affected environment" was defined at a public scoping meeting. The relevant language is as follows:

This language is consistent with that contained in the "Notice of Intent" for the meeting. (A signed copy of the "Determination of Significance" was not made available as a result of a Public Information Request under the Freedom of Information Act, but an unsigned version was returned in response.)

In Early 1997 Parsons Brinckerhoff completed the Final Alternatives Alignment Study for the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road. The study was undertaken to determine the most feasible of possible alternatives under consideration for the Bypass. The alternatives were:

One alternative not considered for study was the use of Highway 18, as it existed at the time, to access I-90. It can be argued that since the roadway already existed and the traffic congestion in Issaquah was an increasing problem, the alternative was not worthy of consideration. On the other hand by not including the alternative, the study eliminated any evaluation of the route with planned improvements.

The study concluded that two north alignments and two south alignments should be considered in the EIS. The alternatives were the subject of a Council Committee of the Whole meeting on April 22, 1997 and the outcome of that meeting summarized in a letter from Mayor Rowan Hinds to the City Council:

At the first Council meeting in April of 1998, the newly-elected Mayor, Ava Frisinger, presented Agenda Bill 4281, "S.E. Bypass Project - Consultant Contract Supplement" to the Council. Following a presentation by Project Manager Lou Haff, the City Council voted unanimously to approve the change.

This second change order updated the Consultant’s SOW to include the provisions of the NEPA. It also contained provisions for contingency work if the 404 Merger process was later required. The Agenda Bill read as follows:

The following two paragraphs are from the SOW description:

Ordinance 2184 dated May 4, 1998, Established a new Chapter 18.16 of the Issaquah land Use Code defining "Transportation Concurrency Management" for the City of Issaquah. The first six-year Transportation Improvement Plan (T.I.P.) was attached as Exhibits "A" and "B."

Transportation Concurrency was established as a requirement of the State Growth Management Act in 1990. The City of Issaquah did not publish its first Comprehensive Plan until 1995. It took until mid-1998 for the Transportation Concurrency requirement to be met.

The approach chosen was to use "Planned Capacity" as a means to set the City LOS at 1998 levels. The theory was that by setting the standard at these levels, developers would then have to pay for any upgrades resulting from their growth impacts.

Ordinance 2193 dated July 6, 1998 put some finishing touches on the new Transportation Concurrency requirements in Issaquah. The Ordinance revised Chapter 18.16, Transportation Concurrency Management, Section 4, to add an exemption for Single Family homes on single lots. The complete list of exemptions was:

Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, projects having significant impact on aquatic resources are required to undergo a coordinated review by multiple responsible agencies. The coordination process became known as the 404 Merger Process and was designed to minimize duplicative administrative overlap between the various agency review procedures. In a letter to WSDOT, dated September 30, 1998 the City of Issaquah agreed to participate in the 404 Merger Agreement process. The process was made a requirement by the anticipated wetland and stream impacts at the south end of the project.

In essence, the 404 Merger Process involves obtaining formal agency agreement on three "Concurrence Points" as follows:

By this process the project proponent minimizes later permitting difficulty (read that cost increase and schedule delay) if the construction option is chosen.

By October the data necessary to meet the requirements of the first two Concurrence Points was forwarded to the Signatory Agencies. Concurrence Point #1 involved agreement on the "Purpose and need Statement." Concurrence Point #2 dealt with the "Project Alternative Alignments for study in the DEIS." These two concurrence points would have typically been met earlier in the project studies had the 404 Merger Agreement been invoked. As a result, the Signatory Agencies were required to catch up with the project as it existed at the time.

It was October of 1998 when Parsons Brinckerhoff completed work on the Final Transportation Technical Report which was prepared as part of the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road EIS process. The Final Transportation Technical Report contains what is essentially a repeat of language regarding the need for the project and the planned growth it would support. On page 6 we find the following:

Once again there is reference to unspecified, albeit planned growth in unincorporated King County south of Issaquah. The report rightly concentrates on the three I-90 interchanges serving Issaquah. A no-build option and two build options were evaluated. One build option assumed the two SPAR facilities were not built but the S.E. Bypass was built and the Sunset Way interchange ramps were developed as part of the Bypass project. The second build option was referred to as the "full-build" option and contained the SPAR facilities, Sunset Way interchange ramps and the S.E. Bypass.

The Final Transportation Technical Report used "screenlines" to report traffic volumes, but in a manner that was different from other writings. Instead of analyzing streets individually, the report combined multiple streets together and analyzed them as a group. An example is the groupings of SR 900 with Front Street and Second Avenue to report northbound and southbound Levels of Service (LOS) at the south end of town. By this combining of streets in the analysis, it was impossible to draw conclusions about the traffic on either Front Street or Second Avenue, which were the focus of concern for the S.E. Bypass project.

Four segments of roadway (North A, North B, South A, and South B) were chosen for detailed analysis in the Final Transportation Technical Report. Any combination of A and B segments was possible since a common footprint near the center of the proposed alignments behind the High School was involved. That said, there is little difference between the various combinations in terms of traffic analysis with the exception of the southern-most intersection between the S.E. Bypass and the Issaquah-Hobart Road. Rather, the environmental impacts of the segments became the deciding factor. Remembering that the "no-build" option involved construction of the North and South SPAR as well as the new ramps at the Sunset Way interchange, the traffic analysis and descriptive text offers much in the way of expectation for traffic flows north of I-90 connecting to the Sammamish Plateau even though these areas are not served by the S.E. Bypass. Upon careful examination of the text, the authors have used the congestion north of I-90 as the main justification for the SE Bypass project.

The report also embraces a new opening year of 2005 rather than 2000, as had been the case in earlier documentation. The design year of 2015 continued to be used. The forecasted traffic volumes were all based primarily on land use projections (growth) north of I-90. Thus, the "no-build" and the "full-build" options show congestion relief north of I-90 while the "S.E. Bypass-build" option provides a worsening congestion in that area of Issaquah. The choice of option packages was destined to make the case for the "full-build" option based almost entirely on increased volumes from the north. A close look at the south end of Issaquah shows roadway links only about half-used during the PM peak hour.

One last observation from the Final Transportation Technical Report is related to the school district facilities. Prior documents have indicated that the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road was needed to keep traffic congestion from forming along Second Avenue south of E. Sunset Way. In this report the primary reason offered is a delay of approximately 15 minutes per bus while passing through the area of the Front Street interchange.

Prior to the release of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road in June of 2000, a Supplemental Transportation Technical Memorandum was published in March of 2000. The supplement was offered to address two significant issues that had surfaced thorough Public Comment and Agency review processes leading up to the DEIS. At the North end of the project a new "North S" alignment was included to avoid splitting Issaquah High School facilities while still not splitting the Sportsman’s Clubhouse from the gun range. The other major change involved using bridges to pass over the wetlands in the south end of the project rather than filling the wetlands. Neither of these changes caused much of a change in the traffic analysis for the project.

There was also a change in the proposed land use relating to the Park Pointe Urban Village Development. The residential portion of the development had been slightly reduced while the commercial areas had been substantially increased (adding 70,000 ft² of office space and 25,000 ft² of retail). These changes added trips to the volume forecasts affecting the utilization of the project.

The SOW was not changed by Change Order #3, but some contingency funds were moved from Task 10 (404 Merger Agreement provisions) to cover cost overruns from two subcontractors (Herrera and Otak).

The City Council was not consulted in the matter, which may well have been in direct violation of State Statute. State law vests authority to enter into contracts – on behalf of a city – with the legislative body (City Council) of that city. The Revised Code of Washington reads as follows:

For a contract to be valid, it must contain a statement of work (SOW); a period of performance, consideration, and the absence of duress. The same is true for changes to a valid contract. Therefore, it follows, that the City Council should have been given an opportunity to vote on any and all changes in the Consultant’s contract.

Once again the SOW was not changed by Change Order #4. This time funds were moved within the overall contract to cover the need for additional "Public Involvement" tasks. There is also indication that the initial submittals for Concurrence Points #1 and #2 under the 404 Merger Agreement had been sent off for agency review. There is no record that the City Council was consulted in the matter.

Contained within the Capital Improvement Provisions of the 1999 City Budget we find $600,000 for the SE Bypass efforts. It is not completely clear from the accompanying text, but the source of these funds is believed to be from State and Federal Grant sources. $200,000 would eventually be carried over and expended in 2000.

By April of 1999 all of the Agencies had completed their review of the materials and provided their official position regarding CP #1 and #2. Neither Concurrence Point had garnered complete concurrence. Issue resolution was required. Correspondence from that period indicates an adversarial relationship between the City of Issaquah and some of the SAC Agencies was evolving. Agency concerns were focusing on bridging the Class 1 wetlands, TDM strategies to reduce the volumes of Regional Traffic, and reevaluation of the decision to drop the Newport Way and May Valley Rd. alternatives from the DEIS. In an email between Mr. Jeff Buckland of Parsons Brinckerhoff and Ms. Elaine Somers of EPA, Ms. Somers states "Since you have stated that the LOS never becomes better than F, with or without the bypass, it will be necessary to clearly indicate this in the EIS." Clearly, the participants already recognized that the project would not offer a solution for transportation congestion in Issaquah.

Change Order #5 involved additional budget of $147,807 to activate the 404 Merger Agreement provisions contained in Task #10. The matter was not brought before the City Council for formal authority to proceed even though it involved expenditure increases and scope of work changes.

On August 16^th, the City Council sent letters of displeasure to Washington State’s Senators and our Representatives from the 8^th and 9^th Districts. The process had degenerated into a conflict between the City and the EPA. These letters sought congressional intervention as a means of achieving EPA Concurrence. Council President David Kappler signed the letters. It is interesting that while EPA was the focus of the letters, the US Fish and Wildlife Service had not concurred either.

Ordinance 2241 dated October 18, 1999 adopted an updated Transportation Concurrency Spreadsheet for 1999 showing 6 failures (none exceeding the applicable baseline by 0.3) and an updated T.I.P. for 2000-2005. The City standard allowed up to 4 failures (none exceeding the applicable baseline by more than 0.3) prior to declaring the City to be failing Transportation Concurrency. This adoption effectively stopped new development except by "exemption." The Urban Villages were not affected because they were grandfathered under prior agreements.

By November of 1999 all of the issues had been resolved. The Purpose and Need Statement had been revised and comments regarding the treatment of wetland intrusions had been prepared. The project was able to progress.

With the Draft EIS nearing release, the City was looking for funding to continue through the Final Environmental Impact Statement. At the May 15, 2000 Council meeting Mayor Ava Frisinger presented Agenda Bill 4580 - SE ISSAQUAH BYPASS BUDGET REVISON (TIP PROJECT B-1) for consideration. While there was $100,000 of City money authorized in the 2000 budget for work on the project EIS, the Agenda Bill disclosed the need for $850,000 and asked for authority to pursue funding from Port Blakely ($750,000) and King County ($1,000,000) for the difference.

In the minutes of that meeting we find evidence of disagreement among the Councilors as follows:

Only the Councilors can say why they voted as they did, but it appears that there was a desire to give the Administration only the amount requested.

Also of interest is the discontinuity between the amount requested from the Council and the amount requested by the Consultant. In a letter from Parsons Brinckerhoff dated July 25, 2000, we find the following:

The only explanation for the difference between the authorization requested from the Council and the amount requested by the Consultant would be that the Administration was maintaining a contingency fund.

Remember that only two months earlier at the May 15^th meeting of the Council, the matter of funding had been met with a divided vote of the Council. The minutes of that meeting clearly show that the Council did not authorize the Mayor to seek King County Funds. Yet in the text of Agenda Bill 4602 - ORDINANCE GRANTING INTER-FUND LOAN FOR SE ISSAQUAH BYPASS, Mayor Ava Frisinger asked the following:

In June of 2000 the Southeast Issaquah Bypass Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was completed. It was prepared as a combined SEPA/NEPA/404 Merger Process effort.

The DEIS discussed the environmental impacts resulting from the chosen Alternative Alignments from the Final Alternatives Alignment Study, Southeast Issaquah Bypass Road Alternatives Alignment Study which had been completed in 1997.

There are two main questions which must be answered regarding the DEIS. First, is the document "adequate?" There is more than one decision as to the adequacy of the document. Each of the co-lead Agencies must determine the adequacy for its unique needs. Second, is the Preferred Alternative the result of an objective, scientifically disciplined analysis of the environmental impacts of the project?

"Adequacy" as it relates to an EIS deals with the documentation of impacts and mitigation of the impacts to the "affected environment." So the first step is to ascertain whether the document has addressed the elements of the "affected environment" as it was defined during the scoping meeting in December of 1996. The second step is to evaluate the content of the analysis for each of those elements to decide if it is sufficient for decision-making purposes. The SEPA regulations contain a checklist, which is usually used to determine the significance of a project. The checklist contains questions, the answers to which will objectively lead to a determination that is in the interest of the public trust. The questions are also useful for evaluating the content of the EIS analysis. The following tabulation is the result of use of the SEPA Checklist questions as a means of evaluating the DEIS discussion for each elements:

The DEIS does a good job of assembling the data for Existing Conditions. It provides superficial analysis for some of the elements of the "affected environment." It provides virtually no tangible mitigation proposals other than to acknowledge that mitigation will be part of the design of the roadway. Thus, there is nothing for the decision-maker, in most cases, to use for evaluating lasting environmental damage from the project. Even the traffic modeling resulted in a skewed outcome as discussed above on page 16 for the Final Transportation Technical Report.

There is an another criterion. The DEIS was developed in response to the Consultant’s Statement of Work (SOW). So, how does the information contained in the DEIS compare to the requirements of that SOW? The SOW required analysis of each of the elements of the "affected environment and the tabulation above shows that each of the elements of the "affected environment" were addressed in the DEIS. The DEIS text provides a summarization of information contained in technical reports required by the SOW, but the technical reports were not all published as appendices to the DEIS. Additionally, the Technical Reports were not disseminated to the public along with the DEIS. To date, a Freedom of Information Request has failed to produce all of the Technical Reports. Thus, the DEIS summarization would reasonably be expected to meet the expectations of decision-makers.

The Preferred Alignment from the DEIS was Alignment 4 (North B, South B). Alternative 4 was the alignment that most tightly hugged the base of Tiger Mountain, split the Sportsman’s Clubhouse from the Gun Range, and dissected the wetland complex at the south end of the project creating a four-way intersection at SE 96^th St. to reach the Issaquah-Hobart Road. Alternative 4 was the most direct route studied.

The Preferred Alignment does not seem to be defended in the DEIS other than to say "..it has been determined to best balance natural and social environmental concerns with the desired action to improve local mobility." A careful review of the minimal analysis that is presented in the DEIS does not allow a selection of any of the build alternatives since the transportation improvements range from small to negative depending on the portion of the infrastructure under consideration.

As had been the case with earlier Public Comment opportunities, the DEIS garnered strong opposition from the citizens. Something on the order of 75-80% of those commenting on the project opposed it for one reason or another.

In their comment letter dated August 14^th, 2000 the Washington State Department of Ecology disagreed with the Preferred Alignment with the following text:

The Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife went even further. In their comment letter dated August 14^th, 2000 we find:

The United States Environmental Protection Agency comment letter, dated September 28^th added to the problem. Their comments challenged the project’s ability to achieve the goals of the "Purpose and Need Statement." The following quote from their comment letter is but one example of such language contained therein:

At the City Council meeting of May 21, 2001, Mayor Ava Frisinger presented another agenda bill for Council consideration. Some insight into her thinking is possible by reading the background text from the agenda bill:

The Mayor had been corresponding with the King County Executive and members of the County Council for some time in an attempt to obtain County funds for the project. Her reasoning involved the overwhelming regional traffic component of the Front Street congestion. Apparently her arguments had found a sympathetic audience, because the County was willing to enter into an interlocal agreement allowing part of their $4M contribution to be used for continuation of the EIS effort.

Following a presentation by Project Manager Lou Haff the Council voted 7-0 to authorize the Mayor to enter into the interlocal agreement.

Change Order #7 was required to evaluate the impact on local streets from the opening of the new Sunset Way Interchange ramps without the added capacity of the SE Bypass facility. The change involved new tasking for a subcontractor (Entranco) and an additional $60,750 of authorized expenditures. Once again the City Council was not formally brought into the change process. Remember that the Administration had additional budget authority from Change Order #6, which had not been allocated to the Consultant.

Change Order #8 authorized the Consultant to begin work on the Supplemental Draft EIS. The need for the Supplemental resulted from the Signatory Agency Committee (SAC) non-concurrence with the preferred alternative from the DEIS. The Preferred Alternative had involved South Alignment B which was declared to be unpermittable. There had been no formal request to revise the Preferred Alignment to one that used South Alignment A. Instead, the efforts had refocused on a new South Alignment C which followed the Railroad Right-Of-Way to an intersection with Front Street S. that would be coincident with the Second Ave. S. intersection. Even though the scope of the contract was expanding and the resulting expenditures were growing, the City Council was not formally asked to approve the change.

Change Order #9 further refined the tasking for the Consultant regarding the Supplemental DEIS. Once again the scope of the contract was expanding, the resulting expenditures were growing, and the City Council was not formally asked to approve the change.

State regulations required that the unused $6M of TIB grant funds be returned to the State.

In a report to the City Council by Project Manager Lou Haff, some excerpts of the new Transportation Technical Report for 2030 were handed out. The Roadway width had grown to 4 lanes. The report indicated:

Bearing in mind that the Issaquah-Hobart Road has only one lane in each direction where was the traffic to go? As quoted from the report, the anticipated flows were more than double what the Issaquah-Hobart Road could be expected to handle; yet the TMODEL software apparently continued to produce results showing no bottlenecking.

During the April 15, 2002 Council Leadership meeting, Council President Fred Butler asked that South Alignment "A" be included in the SDEIS. Since the SDEIS would change the Design Year of the project to 2030, Councilor Butler wanted the alignment updated for comparison purposes. There apparently had been earlier conversations on this subject because the minutes of the meeting reflect:

The Agenda Bill contained the following summary of the S.E. Bypass project:

According to the minutes from the May 20^th meeting of the City Council for consideration of Agenda Bill 4892:

Agenda Bill 4915 made official the Interlocal Agreement language resulting from the vote on Agenda Bill 4892. While that earlier vote was not a unanimous vote, it still represented the will of the majority.

On August 9^th the Administration forwarded the new Concurrence Point #2 package to the SAC Agencies for review. The Alternative Alignments for Study included the three North A, North B, and North C (Previously North S) along with South A and South C. Once again the no-build alignment was part of the package as required by statute.

Recalling that the original reason for the S.E. Bypass was to relieve congestion on neighborhood streets south of E. Sunset Way and East of Front Street S., the Neighborhood Mitigation Study was undertaken a few months prior to the opening of the new Sunset Way interchange ramps. Three alternatives were analyzed:

Public Works Engineering took the results and prepared an Agenda Bill for Council Consideration. Agenda Bill 4969 offered a variety of possible actions ranging from fairly inexpensive to rather expensive and various levels of inconvenience for residents in the area. According to the minutes of the February 18^th, 2003 Council meeting regarding Agenda Bill 4969:

By the end of October, all of the SAC Agencies had concurred with the CP#2 submittal except USEPA. The EPA non-concurrence was based on two elements of the affected environment that were specifically desired for inclusion in the Supplemental DEIS.

Referendum 51 was a possible source of funds for the SE Bypass project. The failure of Referendum 51, at a minimum, complicated the future of the SE Bypass project.

Project Manager Lou Haff resigned. His letter of resignation opened with "Please be advised effective 8:00 am this date Haff Engineering & Management Services terminates its services to the City of Issaquah for all of its contracts including those active and those past inactive but never closed out." No further explanation was ever offered.

The Issue Resolution process had concluded during a meeting on October 24^th with agreement on both of EPS’s concerns. On November 7^th the minutes of that meeting were attached to a new Concurrence form which indicated "concurrence with comments. The SDEIS effort was able to proceed.

On June 1^st the Administration issued a press release saying:

What made this noteworthy was that the previous evening the City Council had been briefed that the document was undergoing "discipline review" at WSDOT. The project was "on schedule and on budget."

On September 2^nd, 2003 Mayor Ava Frisinger presented yet another Agenda Bill for additional S.E. Bypass funding. The salient portion of the text indicated that:

The minutes of the meeting reflect the following:

During the discussion of this matter both Councilors Davidson and Forkner made it clear that they had no intention of approving any additional funding beyond this agenda bill.

The following tabulation summarizes the change order history of the contract with the EIS Consultant (Parsons Brinckerhoff). The City Council has voted on five of the changes. The others were executed by the Administration without a vote of the Council, which was probably in violation of State Statute. Not since Change Order #2 has a compiled version of the SOW been prepared for the Council’s use. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Councilors have an incomplete understanding of the current Consultant’s Contract.

The "affected environment" was never modified so the analysis required for the EIS remains unchanged from that defined by the initial Scope of Work in December of 1996.

The reader will recall that outcome of the DEIS was that "South Alignment B" was declared not to be permitable and the Administration chose not to seek approval of a "Preferred Alternative" using "South Alignment A." The SDEIS offered a different south alignment designated "South Alignment C" which followed the railroad right-of-way to an intersection with Front Street and Second Ave. Owing to the need for the EIS to look twenty years into the future for a "Design year," the SDEIS analysis was required to consider at least 2025 in its evaluation. The Council had been told that since 2025 data was not readily available and 2030 data could be obtained, the SDEIS would use a "build year" of 2005 and a "design year" of 2030.

Agenda Bill 4892 had included "South Alignment A" in the updates for the SDEIS since it had not been officially eliminated from consideration and the new "design year" would make comparison difficult when it came time for a decision.

Just as in the case of the DEIS, the SDEIS must also "adequately" analyze the "affected environment" for the decision-makers. Once again the questions from the SEPA checklist provide an objective means of carrying out the evaluation. The results are:

Once again the public comment was overwhelmingly against the project. Opponents dissected the SDEIS and pointed out a long list of deficiencies in terms both of what the document contained and what the document did not contain. The analysis of the "affected environment was superficial at best for those elements of the environment addressed. The analysis, with no explanation given, ignored even more of the "affected environment." The text contained four different admonitions that the infiltration rates and groundwater levels should be further investigated "prior to selection of the preferred alternative" as a means of verifying the assumptions made when modeling the stormwater ponds.

For the first time when asked about the glaring holes in the analysis, the Administration took the position that the missing information would be "addressed in the permit phase."

In a letter from USEPA, dated July 29^th, 2004, we find an initial evaluation of the SDEIS:

On October 18^th with Councilors Nancy Davidson (Council President), Fred Butler, Bill Conley, Joe Forkner, Russell Joe, David Kappler, and Hank Thomas all in attendance, Mayor Ava Frisinger presented Agenda Bill 5217 asking for Council approval of Alignment Alternative 6 as the Preferred Alignment. A portion of the background text is quoted as follows:

Consultant Doug Matton, who had been acting as Project Manager following the resignation of Lou Haff in November of 2002, provided a presentation. The minutes of the meeting reflect the following regarding the voting which ensued.

There was no action regarding the recommended investigation of infiltration rates or groundwater levels prior to selection of the preferred alternative. To date, the investigation has not been conducted.

Going into the meeting it was unclear how the pending vote would turn out. Events leading up to the meeting indicated that there were probably three votes for and three votes against the Preferred Alignment, but it was far less clear who the swing vote would be. Councilor Davidson’s amendment offered the pro-bypass Councilors a way to prevail. It came as a surprise when Councilor Conley joined the opposition.

The residents at the south end of town living along Lewis Lane SE, SE Lewis St., and Sixth Ave SE were devastated, as were the members of the Sportsman’s Club. The Council vote had effectively ignored the entire reason for the Supplemental EIS effort. The route chosen was one contained in the DEIS, but that had specifically not been chosen as the Preferred Alignment at that time. It appeared that over four years of effort and $2M had been wasted.

At the January 3, 2004 Council Meeting, with Fred Butler (Council President), Bill Conley, Nancy Davidson, Joe Forkner, Russell Joe, David Kappler, and Hank Thomas all in attendance, Mayor Ava Frisinger presented Agenda Bill 5267. In the intervening months since Alternative Alignment #3 was chosen, there had been a great deal of confusion and discussion about the implications of the choice. This new Agenda Bill promoted a change of the Preferred Alignment to Alternative Alignment #5, which contained "North C", and "South A." By this change the Sportsman’s Club would not be separated from the range, but the School District facilities were more significantly impacted. The Lewis Lane neighborhood continued to be affected.

The minutes of the meeting reflect the following:

Under what is known as the 404 Merger Process, there are three Concurrence Points, which must be accepted by the Signatory Agencies. Concurrency Point #3 involves the acceptance of the Preferred Alignment for the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS).

There wasn’t much money left in the budget, so the Administration chose to prepare the CP#3 Package using Staff resources.

Almost immediately it was noticed that there were some reclassification of wetlands and streams in the project corridor. The effect of the reclassification was to make project impacts less problematic by allowing narrower buffers for these environmentally sensitive areas. The changes were attributed to a report from Herrera Environmental Consultants. A review of that document indicated that it contradicted an earlier document from the same firm. In a letter of March 21^st from Herrera, the classifications were restored.

Between April 25^th and April 29^th the City received the comment letters from the Signatory Agencies. All six agencies "non-concurred."

There was conversation that the Staff was doing most of the work on the CP#3 milestone to save money in the budget for the consultant. Effectively this approach would have augmented the SE Bypass budget using Staff salary and benefits budgetary authority. Work was being done, but the monthly progress reports were not showing expenditures consistent with the work effort.

At the May 16^th City Council meeting, during the Good of the Order portion of the Agenda, the minutes show:

In response to a Council inquiry regarding the effect of the SE Bypass inclusion in the City Transportation Concurrency Model, the Administration asked the consulting firm of HDR to evaluate and report on the consequences of removing the project from the model. In their report was contained the following:

With Front Street and Newport Way downgraded and the S.E. Bypass in the model, the model would push trips onto the Bypass. The result would make the Bypass appear to relieve congestion on Front Street when in fact that might not be the case. The report went on to conclude:

That means that the S.E. Bypass was not helping to achieve Transportation Concurrency as had long been alleged.

In an additional memo from the Mayor, it was pointed out that adding restrictions to discourage motorists from using Second Ave could cause a failure on Front St. S. between Newport Way and Second Ave. and that such failure could only be rectified by additional lane capacity.

The next time the reader drives on Front St. S., notice the width of the street. It is already wide enough to accommodate a four-lane configuration. A bucket of paint would solve the problem.

At the June 20^th City Council Meeting, Agenda Bill 5338 was part of the Consent Agenda for referral to the Utilities Committee. It showed that even with the Staff time deducted from the approved budget for the project, there was still $339,089 remaining to complete the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and get a Record of Decision. The Minutes of the meeting reflect:

At the July 5^th City Council meeting, Fred Butler (Council President), Bill Conley, Nancy Davidson, Joe Forkner, Russell Joe, David Kappler, and Hank Thomas were presented with Agenda Bill 5346 which was to provide instructions to the Administration regarding termination of the project. The minutes relating to Agenda Bill 5346 show:

At the July 13^th meeting of the Council Utilities Committee with Joe Forkner, Committee Chair, Nancy Davidson, and Fred Butler all present, the Agenda Bill was discussed. The Utilities Committee minutes read as follows:

Agenda Bill 5346 returned for Council consideration at the July 18^th Council meeting. The minutes relating to Agenda Bill 5346 reflect:

The City Administration went back to the Signatory Agency Committee (SAC) to resolve the reasons for their earlier non-concurrence. When the issues could not be resolved with the technical reviewers, it was bumped up the line to their management (Level #2). When the Level #2 management reviewers could not all concur, it was bumped further up the line to higher management. At Level #3, the last of the issue resolutions were resolved. The City Administration agreed to performance standards for the project as a means of gaining SAC concurrence. The City Council was never briefed or asked to agree to be bound by the performance standards. In March of 2006, the last of the letters of concurrence came in from the SAC Agencies.

As of this writing, the FEIS is being prepared. Based on previous documentation, it is expected not to contain a full and complete analysis of the "affected environment" for either the "Preferred Alignment" or the "no-build" alignment. Assuming that to be the case, the Council will have little new information on which to base their "build/no-build" decision.

The Record of Decision (ROD) refers to a formal filing in the Congressional Record of the completion of the Environmental Impact Statement under the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The filing of a ROD effectively establishes the project as being buildable as evaluated by FHWA against the provisions of the NEPA. It will then be legally arguable that the project must be build under the terms of the Master Transportation Financing Agreement (MTFA). The City Administration has been advising the City Council that the ROD is an FHWA matter – not under the City’s control. The following language is quoted from the text of Consultant’s Contract SOW, Change Order #2:

The language is updated with new tasking contained in Change Order #9 as follows:

These provisions remain unchanged by Change Orders #10 and #11. Clearly, there is anticipated to be involvement by the City Administration in obtaining the ROD.

As stated in the opening paragraphs, this document attempts to summarize the chronology of events relating to the SE Bypass Project. If that goal has been met, each reader will have evaluated the material as an objective and unbiased presentation of the facts. Each reader will also have incorporated these events into his or her thinking according to their personal remembrance of the timeframe. The result is hoped to be a more informed public as it relates to this most controversial matter in the community.